2014 Central Branch and County Pilot THIRA/PR

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THIRA

- **THIRA is NOT based on current capability levels. It asks where we want to be**
- The Central Branch THIRA Pilot focused on **Steps 3 & 4**
- Steps 3 & 4 conducted by examining and evaluating the 31 Core Capabilities based off formulated scenarios

What are the Core Capabilities?

Prevention	Protection	Mitigation	Response	Recovery
Planning				
Public Information and Warning				
Operational Coordination				
Forensics and Attribution Intelligence and Information Sharing Interdiction and Disruption Screening, Search, and Detection	Access Control and Identity Verification Cybersecurity Intelligence and Information Sharing Interdiction and Disruption Physical Protective Measures Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities Screening, Search, and Detection Supply Chain Integrity and Security	Community Resilience Long-term Vulnerability Reduction Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment Threats and Hazard Identification	Critical Transportation Environmental Response/Health and Safety Fatality Management Services Infrastructure Systems Mass Care Services Mass Search and Rescue Operations On-scene Security and Protection Operational Communications Public and Private Services and Resources Public Health and Medical Services Situational Assessment	Economic Recovery Health and Social Services Housing Infrastructure Systems Natural and Cultural Resources

CBO Scenarios

- Three scenarios were developed that served as the context from which the 31 core capabilities were examined through during the THIRA process
  - One Natural Hazard scenario
  - One Tech Hazard scenario
  - One Human Hazard scenario

Natural Hazard Scenario – Hurricane

Hurricane (Based off historical Hurricane Fran)

A category three hurricane moving northwest makes landfall on the coast of North Carolina on Friday night and the eye of the storm centers over central NC at 3:30 am Saturday before downgrading to a tropical storm. Orange, Wake and their surrounding counties experience an influx in population as NCSU football hosts #1 FSU Saturday night while UNC is also hosting alumni weekend. Earlier forecasts projected the storm to only brush Eastern NC and bypass the State by 1800 hrs. on Friday, which encourages residents and guests to not vacate central NC. The hurricane brings sustained winds of approximately 115 mph and heavy rainfall where, in just Raleigh, 8.8 inches is recorded over a 24 – hour period. The ensuing winds and rain result in:

- Numerous floods and flash floods
- Widespread five to 10 inches of rain
- 24 fatalities (21 from flooding)
- 1.7 million customers without electricity
- $1.1 billion in public property damage (debris removal, roads and bridges, public buildings)
- $900 million in damage to residential and commercial property

Natural Hazard Scenario – Hurricane



DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

North Carolina Emergency Management

Tech Hazard Scenario – Cyber-security

Cyber-security

During early August, high humidity and high temperatures have affected the state for at least 7 days. A Stuxnet worm has infiltrated the sensitive Industrial Control System (ICS) which regulates the electrical grid that serves North Carolina. The Southeastern Interconnection has attempted to manage it through a variety of means, however, after 72-hours of rolling blackouts a widespread power outage has affected the region. Effects of the outage include:

- Residential and Commercial climate control systems are inoperable
- Retail sales of food and gas are non-existent
- Citizens can neither go to work nor work from home
- Traffic control devices are inoperable and the roads are littered with stalled vehicles
- Public Outcry

Human Hazard Scenario – Riots

Riots

The culmination of alleged police brutality following the deaths of unarmed suspects in Durham and Raleigh sparks widespread public demonstrations during the holiday season in December. Social media is effectively used to organize mass gatherings near Duke University, NCSU and the Raleigh downtown area, and Chapel Hill. Over a three day period the demonstrations in Durham turn violent as three police cruisers are destroyed by Molotov cocktails and local police exchange gunfire with demonstrators, but it is unclear who fired first. Approximately 2,500 local and outside participants are involved as local businesses are looted, roads closed, and a curfew is enforced.

- 300 officers needed in Durham per night
- 100 officers needed in Raleigh per night
- Three protesters killed
- 5 police injured
- 43 protesters injured
- 225 arrested
- 14 local businesses in Durham destroyed

Capability Target (Step 3)

- Each Core Capability establishes a Capability Target
- Capability Targets are our **"definition of success"** for a core capability based on our hurricane, riot and hazmat scenarios
- **Should be specific and measurable (considers percent or number, location and time)**
- Considers potential impacts and desired outcomes
- Some core capabilities are more straight forward than others

Capability Target (Step 3)

Example:

Threat/Hazard	Earthquake	Terrorism
Context Description	A magnitude 7.8 earthquake along the Mainline Fault occurring at approximately 2:00 PM on a weekday with ground shaking and damage expected in 19 counties, extending from Alpha County in the south to Tau County in the north, and into the Zeta Valley.	A potential threat exists from a domestic group with a history of using small IEDs in furtherance of hate crimes. There are a number of large festivals planned during the summer at open air venues that focus on various ethnic and religious groups. These events draw on average 10,000 attendees daily.
Core Capability: Mass Search and Rescue Operations		
Capability Target	Within 72 hours, rescue: ▪ 5,000 people in 1,000 completely collapsed buildings ▪ 10,000 people in 2,000 non-collapsed buildings ▪ 20,000 people in 5,000 buildings ▪ 1,000 people from collapsed light structures.	

Resource Estimation (Step 4)

- Only required for Core Capabilities found in the Response and Recovery Mission Areas
- Estimation of 1) **what type of resource** (NIMS or Other) and 2) **how much** of that resource is required to accomplish established Capability Target?
- **Not based on what resources currently exist**

Resource Estimation (Step 4)

Example:

Core Capability: Mass Search and Rescue Operations	
Capability Target	Within 72 hours, rescue: ▪ 5,000 people in 1,000 completely collapsed buildings ▪ 10,000 people in 2,000 non-collapsed buildings ▪ 20,000 people in 5,000 buildings ▪ 1,000 people from collapsed light structures.

Resource Requirement	
Resources	**Number Required**
Type I US&R Task Forces	10
Type II US&R Task Forces	38
Collapse Search and Rescue (S&R) Type III Teams	100
Collapse S&R Type IV Teams	20
Canine S&R Type I Teams	20

State Preparedness Report (SPR)

- An internal assessment of current capability levels through gap analysis
- Conducted a local version of the SPR
- Based off the "definition of success" we established in the THIRA process, we cannot complete this without the THIRA
- Unlike the THIRA, **the SPR is based off current capabilities**

State Preparedness Report (SPR)

- Each Core Capability examined through Planning, Organization, Equipment, Training and Exercise (POETE)
- Each sector of POETE will gives:
  - 1) An Internal Rating (1-5)
  - 2) Internal Rating + Mutual Aid Rating
  - 3) Gap Description (why am I not a 5?)
  - 4) Recent Advances (what am I doing that is bringing us closer to a 5?)

Purpose?

1) THIRA – Here is where we want to be



3) Capability Gaps addressed through SHSS update

2) SPR– Here is where we actually are

Central Branch Manager Perspective

- Steve Powers
  - Role and Responsibilities
  - Expectations
  - Takeaways
    - Housing

County Perspective

Brent Fisher	Nash County EM
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County Takeaways

- Great opportunity to discuss issues (scenarios) that are for the most part "universal" to each county regarding possible affects that they would have on individual counties

- The need to review County's internal capabilities regarding Hazard Threat and Risk Analysis, specifically our county's ability to support EM functions for minimum of 72hrs

- Excellent opportunity to listen to other counties as they provided input on hazard/threat identification. Focus during the meetings was centered around three scenarios (natural, tech, & man-made hazard) with a focus on the 31 core capabilities

County Takeaways

- Definite need to reach out to mutual aid (surrounding Counties) to determine resources available for our immediate use. Also the need to share our resource list with surrounding counties as well

- Agreement that the "Response" piece of the incident, for the most part, appears to be clear and distinct regarding the methods needed to handle this portion of the incident. However, the "recovery" portion of the incident and the "mitigation" pieces of the incident need additional focus

- Need to assist with updating COOP plans, especially for critical infrastructure

County Takeaways

- Funding identified as one of the largest "obstacles" to overcome when dealing with any incident, especially regarding Planning, Organization, Equipment, Exercise and Training
- Some resources for funding these areas identified were as follows:
  - Utilize DPRs monies to address planning, organization, equipment, exercise and training
  - Manpower- strengthen local mutual aid responses
  - EMPG- potentially use THIRA issues as Activities within the EMPG. Tracking EMPG activities within WebEOC has proven to be advantageous in keeping up with completion of activities

County Takeaways

- Process has the potential to finally tie all state and local planning documents together for a common goal in meeting our true response and recovery needs in the state
- If utilized correctly, THIRA could allow state and locals to plan future grants to meet true capability gaps in our programs
- Key for this to work is that folks take an honest look at the programs and true capabilities not perceived

County Takeaways

- Long-term Vulnerability Reduction, Physical Protective Measures, Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment and Threats and Hazard Identification capabilities yielded the following:
  - Potential for locals to collaborate with NCEM to develop statewide standard for what defines critical infrastructure and/or other key assets (allow flexibility)
  - Using this standard, develop potential five year plan to identify critical assets, one sector per year, in local jurisdictions
  - Once identified, analyze results to better understand local risks and gaps

Questions?