I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

This appendix outlines actions and procedures the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC), the Agriculture Emergency Operations Center (Ag EOC), and the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) take when a Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) threatens susceptible animals in North Carolina. North Carolina will seek the assistance of and cooperate with the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) on a local and national level in accordance with their FAD Plan.

B. SCOPE

This appendix will be activated in coordination with the State Veterinarian’s Office or designees and North Carolina Emergency Management (NCEM) when there is a credible FAD threat to North Carolina.

II. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. SITUATION

There are a number of facilities and animal population groups in North Carolina that are vulnerable to naturally occurring Foreign Animal Disease (FADs) as well as potential targets for biological terrorist attacks. Response to these types of events may involve local, state, federal and private agencies. Agribusinesses that breed and produce susceptible animals in the hundreds or thousands within the confines of a single operation make an attractive target for such events. A major outbreak of a foreign animal disease could cripple the affected industry and dependent businesses for years. Export markets would be lost and production would dramatically decrease. Businesses would fail. Tax revenue generated directly and indirectly would diminish dramatically. North Carolina's ability to export that type of susceptible animal species would virtually end for three to five years. If the disease spread to other states, it could have a devastating impact on the United States’ ability to feed its people and to compete in the global marketplace. In the case of FADs with significant human health effects, the response urgency and economic impact may be much greater.

Activation will be a result of notification of NCEM through the State Emergency Response Team by the North Carolina Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (NCDA&CS), which will likely be the first state agency to detect a potential for FAD. The State Veterinarian (SV) is the responsible individual within NCDA&CS for FADs and works with the
Emergency Program (EP) Director to coordinate with the SERT. An Incident Management Team (IMT) will be activated by the SV that initially will be comprised of NCDA&CS employees during the investigation period but will quickly include other partners if the event escalates into a large outbreak. The Incident Management Team will utilize the Incident Command System to manage the response to the outbreak. In most FAD situations, NCDA&CS in coordination with USDA would be the lead state agency with the SERT in support. There are situations such as a zoonotic or bioterrorist event that USDA, EM, Public Health, Law Enforcement, and NCDA & CS representatives may be included in a Unified Command structure. Policy decisions will be formed through a Policy Group comprised of the Commissioner of Agriculture (or designee), SV, USDA representative, Public Information Officer (PIO) and any other representatives of agencies, Industry, or subject matter experts that the SV deems important to policy determinations and will be implemented by the IMT.

B. ASSUMPTIONS

1. In the event of a naturally occurring or terrorist initiated FAD outbreak in North Carolina, the North Carolina Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services through the State Veterinarian (SV) has the authority to take a lead role and serve as a technical advisor to the SERT Leader under the NCEOP in the response.

2. In any FAD event, the United States Department of Agriculture’s Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC) will collaborate with the SV’s Office in the state and will lead the federal response.

3. Understanding that NC may not be the first state to become affected by an outbreak, resulting in limited federal resources, the SV and SERT must be prepared to proceed with FAD incident response with limited federal agency participation.

4. For the purpose of plan development, a worst-case scenario was assumed, involving the discovery of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) at one or more production sites in the swine industry.

5. Because animals are exported out of the state and out of the country, an infection could rapidly become a national or multinational event. The costs associated with the loss of animals, production, exports, and indirect items may be in the billions of dollars. Any delay in detection of a FAD and implementation of this plan may increase these costs.
6. Due to the unique regulatory nature of FAD emergencies and the policy decisions required, there will be more direction to the ICPs and Branch Offices from the Policy Group/State IMT, and specifically from the SV due to regulatory authorities, than with other types of SERT Operations.

7. If a zoonotic disease were involved, NCDA&CS would share the lead agency role through a Unified Command IMT with the NC Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Public Health with specific responsibility for human health. Public Health would also be represented in the policy group and if human infections occurred would become the lead agency for all human health concerns.

III. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

A. LEAD STATE AGENCY

1. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY (DPS)

NORTH CAROLINA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (NCEM)

a. Incident Command Posts (ICPs) at County or Branch EOC’s manned by NCEM Incident Management Teams (IMT) are bound to decisions made by veterinary authorities within the scope of the Incident Response Plan. ICPs may be located at county EOCs or elsewhere as necessary to accomplish their missions. Response zones may cross county lines.

b. Initially, outbreak management will occur through the State IMT in conjunction with the County EOC in the affected county. As an outbreak expands, additional County EOCs would be activated to provide command/logistical support. Incident Command Posts (ICP) could be established at remote locations.

c. NCEM will provide logistical support for the FAD IMT which would include tracking and managing resource requests at the SEOC. Logistics will also establish an identification office in the vicinity (ex. County EOC) to provide identification badges to all persons authorized entry into restricted areas (EOC’s, Zones, Infected Premises, etc.)

d. NCEM will be represented in the Joint Information Center (JIC). Close coordination between USDA and the NCDA &CS as well as any other lead agencies for this activity is important.
B. LEAD TECHNICAL AGENCY

1. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE & CONSUMER SERVICES (NCDA&CS)

   a. The NCDA&CS through the State Veterinarian (SV) is the lead technical agency for FAD events and serves as a technical advisor to the SERT Leader. Official communication and documentation for FAD events will be through USDA’s Emergency Management Response System 2.0 (EMRS2) and NC SPARTA, supplemented by radio, telephone, and written memo as necessary. EMRS2 is the response software package that USDA and States use to manage the information, reporting, permitting, and documentation of disease response. NC SPARTA would be used for requesting and tracking local and state resources along with reporting and documentation to County EM and state/local Law Enforcement.

   b. The SV in collaboration with USDA is responsible for assigning personnel (Foreign Animal Disease Diagnosticians (FADD)) to investigate premises that have reported animals that are showing signs compatible with FAD or that may have received animals from an infected area. Such a premises may be quarantined pending test results.

   c. The SV or designee also makes determinations as to appropriate resources for quarantining affected premises, ensuring the depopulation of designated animals, disposal of dead animals, and decontamination of premises coordinating with SERT and USDA.

   d. NCDA&CS SV’s Office is responsible for activation of an Incident Management Team (IMT) to oversee the response activities needed to eradicate/manage a disease outbreak. The IMT would assign all personnel needed to manage the event both in the SEOC as well as in the field. The SV and USDA will form a Unified Command and include any other agencies as deemed necessary based on the type of FAD occurring. The SV would also form the Policy Group either upon confirmation of an outbreak or even before confirmation to aid in policy decisions. If there is confirmation or high suspicion of an FAD on a premises, a Case Manager and Biosecurity Officer would be the first personnel assigned to the premises to formulate the premises specific response plan. Depending on the size of the outbreak, Branch Offices and remote ICPs may be established by the IMT which would work with Emergency Management to assign appropriate personnel.
e. The IMT may be located at the Ag EOC, SEOC or remote ICP depending on the size and scope of the outbreak. The response partner agencies that assist in disasters will be formed into the SART (State Agricultural Response Team) and will serve as a Multiagency Coordination Group (MAC) to help collect/disseminate information as well as identify resources necessary for response.

f. For FAD emergencies, the SERT is organized as detailed below:

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Unified Command:
SERT Leader,
State Veterinarian,
State Animal
Response Team
(SART)

Logistics  Planning  Operations  Finance/Admin

Regional Coordination Centers  Statewide Surveillance

State Epidemiology
  Trace In/Out
  Zone Vaccination
  Zone Permitting
  Division (Control Zone) Surveillance

County or Area EM Strike Teams (EM Area Coordinator) Veterinary Supervisor (and/or County Branch Veterinarian)
  Task Force Leaders (Site)

Eradication  Business Continuity
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g. Adjustments to the classic SERT organization may occur during a FAD incident depending on size and scope of an outbreak. The Incident Commander, in consultation with the Policy Group, will establish incident objectives, which would include activities in the following areas:

- Biosecurity Protocol Implementation;
- Veterinary Resource Management;
- Epidemiology;
- Surveillance; and
- Infected premises operations (euthanasia as needed, disposal, and decontamination).

h. Statewide Surveillance activities are organized under the Operations Section within the IMT. Coordination of border and facility surveillance as well as surveillance at other points of potential disease entry, such as airports, port, rail, and mail facilities will be prioritized according to the outbreak needs.

i. The SV may assign personnel to serve at Regional and County Emergency Operation Centers, to assist with the management of the veterinary and animal related activities.

j. An epidemiology function will be included in the IMT and will coordinate the collection of disease-related information, disease spread detection, and prevention efforts such as trace in/out, permitting, and vaccination control. Epidemiology activities include both investigation of the outbreak and also developing an understanding of how to prevent disease from spreading to negative premises.

k. Those personnel assigned to infected premises will be considered contaminated and will undergo wait periods before entering negative premises or into areas containing equipment/personnel that are considered non-contaminated.
l. Operations is responsible for all response activities and will include activities on infected premises as well as activities on premises not known to be infected (ex. Surveillance and Biosecurity). Activities on infected premises may include depopulation (either to manage the outbreak or due to animal welfare concerns), disposal of carcasses and contaminated materials and decontamination of personnel, equipment, and the premises. Industry personnel and/or contractors will play a substantial role in carrying out the operational activities on infected premises and may enter into contracts with USDA.

m. To assist County and/or Regional response, Division Veterinary Supervisors may be assigned to the EM Branch Offices and/or County EOCs to assist in managing the zoned response areas. Division Veterinary Supervisors would work directly with the Case Managers and Biosecurity Officers on the infected premises.

n. Case Managers will work directly with owners of infected premises to ensure all necessary documentation requirements are met. This would include documentation for indemnity (appraisal), herd or flock plan, as required, and contracts for activities.

o. Permitting of animals and animal products will be accomplished using EMRS with the primary purpose of assisting in disease containment efforts and facilitating business continuity during the response.

p. The NCEM Branch Offices provide ready access to the NC SPARTA system. Due to the highly contagious nature of diseases such as Foot and Mouth Disease and Avian Influenza, multiple counties may become involved in an outbreak quickly. To help coordinate activities across jurisdictions, NC SPARTA will be used to facilitate resource requesting/tracking, information dissemination, and especially law enforcement activities. EMRS contains and uses protected industry information and will be used by health officials to manage disease tracking/reporting and permitted movement of animals and animal product.

q. Activities such as investigations, placing quarantines, depopulation, disposal, and decontamination will be overseen by trained personnel such as veterinarians who may oversee multiple infected sites. Non-veterinary personnel may be asked to carry out some of these tasks following appropriate instruction and oversight by assigned personnel. Safety Officers will oversee and approve activities on all premises as well as in Operational Briefings and on Incident Action Plans.
Case Managers (CM) will work with farm/animal owners/operators to provide information and guidance for contracting of services and activities to be performed and answer questions the owners/operations may have. CMs will work closely with the Biosecurity Officer on infected premises to ensure that the risk of disease spread from contamination of equipment or personnel is reduced as much as possible.

C. SUPPORTING STATE AGENCIES

1. NC DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (NCDHHS)

   NC DIVISION OF PUBLIC HEALTH (DPH)

   a. In the event that an FAD is zoonotic, NC DPH will coordinate with local health departments with regards to the investigation and monitoring of disease in response personnel and other exposed individuals as well as provide technical expertise to the IMT on safety protocols.

2. NC DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (NCDEQ)

   a. Provide trained personnel to assist in field and on infected premises as needed.

   b. Provide expertise in determination of adequate disposal sites as needed.

   c. Provide guidance, in collaboration with NCDA&CS, on biosecurity, decontamination, on-farm burial/disposal, composting, incineration, and transport for disposal and/or rendering.

   d. Establish and maintain points of contact within the private disposal industry sector, at the Federal level, and with other states.

   e. Provide general educational information for the public via website and publications.

3. NC WILDLIFE RESOURCES COMMISSION (NCWRC)

   a. WRC will provide expertise related to detection and management of a FAD in wildlife populations.
D. SUPPORTING FEDERAL AGENCIES

1. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (USDA)
   a. Confirm diagnosis through National Veterinary Services Laboratory.
   b. Make initial national announcement of FAD confirmation with NCDA&CS.
   c. Act as liaison between interested parties: contractors, other states, other countries.
   d. Determine how and when depopulation may take place with indemnity guaranteed.
   e. Initiate indemnity procedures – coordinate appraisal of herd/flock.
   f. Provide trained personnel to assist in incident response in Command or General Staff positions or enter into Unified Command.
   g. Provide epidemiology support.
   h. Negotiate with and approve contractors to help with response if needed.
   i. Provide resources as requested from National Veterinary Stockpile.
   j. Coordinate communication between NCDA&CS and USDA District Office and/or Riverdale USDA office.

IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. GENERAL

When the NCDA&CS receives a report of an illness in susceptible animals in North Carolina that appears to be a FAD, the SV or designee coordinates with the USDA to assign a Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) to the premises to investigate the report. The SV will assign appropriate state veterinary personnel to assist the USDA. Following an initial investigation, the event will be classified based on the degree of suspicion that the animals are infected with a FAD; high suspicion, intermediate suspicion, or low suspicion. In the case of a low suspicion classification, no notification outside of the NCDA&CS will be made.
B. NOTIFICATION

When there is no FAD outbreak currently in the US but investigation of a potential FAD event on a premise in NC is determined to be of intermediate or high suspicion, the SV will notify the Director of Emergency Programs Division (NCDA&CS) who will then notify NCEM. This constitutes Level 4 activation status for the SERT. The SV and EP Director will make a determination regarding the activation of an IMT or team notification of the investigation.

If there is confirmation of an FAD outbreak nationally but not in NC, this constitutes Level 3 activation status for the SERT. A limited IMT may be activated to review plans and assess readiness for response to an FAD should one be detected in NC.

When the USDA notifies the SV that a premise under investigation has been confirmed to have a FAD, the SV will notify the SERT of the confirmed classification. The SERT will be elevated to Level 2 activation. The IMT in consultation with the Policy Group will establish Response Zones consisting of the infected premises, the infected zone, the buffer zone, and the surveillance zone. Surveillance of susceptible animals will be conducted in the Control Area (Infected and Buffer Zones) according to response protocols as quickly as possible.

The Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Services along with the NCEM Director will advise the Governor and may ask for emergency declarations at the State or Federal level. If a zoonotic disease is suspected, DHHS will be included in all briefings and decision processes.

When USDA/SV determines the FAD has spread beyond the original infected premises, NCEM will order for a Level 1 activation to increase support to the response effort.

C. RESPONSE ACTIONS

1. INITIAL

   a. Investigation and Case Characterization


   c. Establish Incident Command Organization Facilities and Joint Information Center
2. CONTINUING

a. As the FAD event progresses, the number of infected premises or quarantine areas may increase requiring implementation of area commands under the National Incident Management System. All of these groups will remain under the direction of the SV and the SERT/IMT throughout the event.

b. Implementation of enhanced biosecurity protocols.

c. Surveillance activities within the zoned areas and on premises that have received potentially contaminated/infected animals, feed, equipment, and/or personnel.

d. Depopulation (either whole premises or for animal welfare considerations) and Disposal of carcasses, contaminated materials, etc.

e. Interagency Liaison and Coordination.

f. Public Affairs and Media Management.

g. Logistics, Supply, and Transportation.

h. Medical Support and Human Factors.

i. Business and Industry Liaison.

j. Research and Laboratory Support.

k. History, Forms, and Reporting (NC SPARTA, EMRS, etc.).
V. REFERENCES

A. Chapter 166A of the North Carolina General Statutes, North Carolina Emergency Management Act, as amended

B. Chapter 130A of the North Carolina General Statutes, Public Health

C. NC National Veterinary Stockpile Plan

VI. TABS

A. State Border and Traffic Security

B. FAD Containment and Quarantine

C. Depopulation and Disposal of FAD Infected Animals

D. FAD Decontamination

E. Incident Management Teams for FAD
I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

This tab establishes plans to monitor traffic entering North Carolina to assure infected animals are not imported and that those animals without proper permits are removed, quarantined, or denied entry into North Carolina.

II. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. SITUATION

1. Background. If a FAD is diagnosed in another state, it is important to secure North Carolina’s borders to prevent introduction of the disease causing agent. Border security focuses on efforts that will prevent interstate movements of infected or contaminated susceptible animals, equipment, etc. from states that are infected with a FAD. Movements of animal or animal products, equipment, and personnel from zones that are established around infected premises will be done through a permitting process utilizing USDA’s Emergency Management Response System 2.0 (EMRS2). Intrastate movements are currently handled through permits issued by the SV and interstate movements are coordinated through USDA. Animals found in transit on NC roadways from areas infected with a FAD must be addressed through quarantine or controlled transportation routing actions that would remove them from the State.

2. Current. There have been no instances of a FAD in North Carolina, but cases may be confirmed in one or more other states. It will be necessary to closely control entry of susceptible animals into and any movement of them within NC.

B. ASSUMPTIONS

1. The threatening disease is highly infectious and could be devastating for large portions of North Carolina’s susceptible animal populations.

2. An outbreak of a FAD that has zoonotic potential could bring significant human health problems and could cripple the North Carolina’s agricultural economy.
STATE BORDER AND INTERSTATE TRAFFIC SECURITY FOR FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE (FAD)
December 2021

3. Strict control of North Carolina’s borders and the movement of susceptible animals through a permitting process within the State will be an effective measure for reducing risk of a FAD introduction into NC. Restricting the importation of susceptible animals/animal products through permitting and monitoring the entry of equipment, personnel and vehicles from infected areas will lessen the probability of a FAD introduction to NC.

III. MISSION

According to instructions from the State Veterinarian (SV), the SERT is to secure North Carolina borders and major highway thoroughways to an extent sufficient to reduce the risk of spread of FADs from other states. The success of this mission depends on close coordination with the USDA, other State Departments of Agriculture and Emergency Management Agencies in adjacent States along with clear communication of policies and permitting requirements to the impacted industries and the public.

IV. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

A. ORGANIZATION

The SERT Emergency Services Branch, through appropriate SERT Branch Offices, will establish locations, schedules, and identify personnel necessary to secure borders.

B. RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The NC Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (NCDA &CS) through the SV is the lead technical agency for FAD incidents and is responsible for providing appropriate criteria by which certain animals, equipment, and personnel are to be denied entry into or evicted from North Carolina.

2. The SERT Operations Section, Human Services Branch, is responsible for supporting the SV in FAD incident response and coordinating FAD border and thoroughway control activities statewide. Emergency Services Branch will support Human Services Branch with law enforcement coordination as needed.

3. The North Carolina State Highway Patrol (NCSHP) is responsible for staffing border monitoring points as required and appropriate according to instructions from the SERT Emergency Services Branch and the Branch
Office. The NCSHP is also responsible for paying particular attention to animal transport vehicles within the State as a part of normal patrol activities.

4. County and local law enforcement are responsible for manning border control monitoring points as required and appropriate according to instructions from the SERT Emergency Services Branch, NCSHP, and the applicable field branch offices.

V. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. Monitoring points will be established at appropriate locations including weigh stations and visitor centers. Entry points to North Carolina on the five major Interstate Highways (I-26, I-40, I-77, I-85, and I-95) will receive priority attention with regard to placement of law enforcement personnel to monitor movement of vehicles carrying livestock, produce, equipment, etc. Visitor centers and weigh stations may also be used as information dissemination sites.

2. The State Highway Patrol and county and local law enforcement officers will maintain other highway and road surveillance activities through routine patrols. Patrols may also be implemented if a neighboring state becomes infected. The SV will provide screening criteria and help in determining the risk of questionable shipments for law enforcement officers.

3. Monitoring will include vehicles that normally haul livestock (including horse trailers). Animal transport vehicles may be stopped and inspected for proper permits. Any officer who detects susceptible animals without proper permits will promptly notify the appropriate State or Ag EOC point-of-contact to provide information to the SV (or designee) of the origin of the animal shipment in question. The SV (or designee) will determine the disposition of the offending vehicle which may be escorted across the border and out of North Carolina or to designated quarantine areas.

4. Officers may stop any other vehicle containing produce, livestock, animal products and/or equipment from an infected area. Drivers hauling such items should have proof of origin and if traveling through or out of the designated Zones, have required movement permits in EMRS2. The SV will be notified of vehicles lacking proper paperwork. If the SV determines contamination is likely, the offending vehicle may be escorted across the border and out of North Carolina into the state from which it entered or to a designated quarantine area. The SV will notify the appropriate neighboring state’s veterinary office before an offending vehicle leaves North Carolina.
FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE (FAD) CONTAINMENT AND QUARANTINE

December 2021

I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

This tab documents plans to prevent the spread of a Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) by quarantine and containment of designated animals, equipment, and personnel.

II. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. SITUATION

1. Background. North Carolina’s agribusiness industry along with businesses who depend on it could be crippled for years with a major outbreak of a FAD in the state. Export and production would decrease. Businesses would fail. Tax revenue generated directly and indirectly would diminish dramatically. The State’s ability to export that type of livestock or products derived from livestock, would virtually end for three to five years. And, if the disease spreads to other states, it could have a devastating impact on the United States’ ability to compete in the global marketplace. If the disease is zoonotic, then the threat to human health and well-being would greatly increase the socio-economic impact and the response and recovery resource requirements.

2. Current. A FAD incident in incident has occurred and a premise is under investigation due to animals showing signs consistent with a FAD infection in NC and is classified by the NC Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (NCDA&CS) State Veterinarian (SV) as “Highly Suspect” or “Confirmed”. Significant portions of the State’s susceptible animal population are threatened. Depending on the extent of the outbreak, quarantine(s) may be required for a single farm/premises, several farms/premises, an entire county, several counties, or the entire state.

B. ASSUMPTIONS

1. The disease is very contagious, and it is critical to maintain strict bio-security.

2. Laboratory confirmation may not be possible before the disease has spread well beyond its initial point. Containment Zoning defines areas around infected premises where protocols such as increased biosecurity
and permitted movement may be implemented. These zones may start as 10-km areas but may expand to involve multiple counties.

3. NCDA&CS, as a stand-alone agency, may not have sufficient resources to administer and enforce the Restrictions in the Zones. The NCDA&CS calls upon the NC Division of Emergency Management (NCEM) for assistance as part of the State Emergency Response Team (SERT).

4. The State Veterinarian (SV) would designate the Containment Zones and movement restrictions.

III. MISSION

To contain a FAD in as small an area as possible until it can be eradicated.

IV. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

A. ORGANIZATION

Once SERT activation occurs due to a suspected or confirmed FAD incident, all response activities will be coordinated through the SERT, the Ag EOC and the SV’s Office. Formal communications will be through the NC SPARTA and EMRS2 (USDA) Systems for the purpose of documentation, tracking, and direction of activities. The IMT Operations Section will designate qualified individuals as Premises Case Managers, Biosecurity Officers, and Division Veterinary Supervisors (DVS) as well as all other personnel to perform the assigned tasks needed in the Containment Zones and on Infected Premises. The DVS will work with the Emergency Management Branch Manager or the Emergency Management Area Coordinator to implement the containment procedures. The size and composition of response teams will be determined according to the size of the area, operations, activities, and availability of personnel. NCSHP and local law enforcement will be assigned enforcement roles within containment zones as part of their patrol duties for restricted animal movement during an outbreak. NCNG may be requested to assist in various roles during an outbreak.
B. RESPONSIBILITIES

1. NCDA &CS SV in coordination with the USDA AVIC will:

   (a) Exercise overall responsibility for a FAD incident investigation, classification, containment, control, and remediation.

   (b) Activate the Policy Group and Incident Management Team at the appropriate time of FAD investigation or confirmation.

   (c) Appoint qualified individuals to serve in key technical areas of FAD incident response.

   (d) Guide the Policy Group to make decisions and recommendations to the Incident Commander/IMT regarding FAD response activities and resource commitment.

   (e) Coordinate response activities with the NC SERT and USDA.

2. The SERT Operations Section (Emergency Services Branch) will:

   (a) Coordinate with appropriate agencies to establish law enforcement quarantine teams of sufficient size to cordon the area(s) identified by veterinary authorities.

   (b) Coordinate with the SERT Logistics Section to arrange for the NCNG to assist with assigned activities as needed.

   (c) Provide formal communication through the NC SPARTA System for purposes of documentation, clarity, and tracking of response activity.

3. The SERT Operations Section (Human Services Branch) in coordination with the SERT Logistics Section will arrange for establishment and operation of comfort stations to support operations.

4. The SHP will serve as lead agency to enforce animal movement restrictions on public roadways.

5. The Emergency Services Branch (Enforcement Section) and all other State, County, and local law enforcement agencies will assist the NCSHP and NCNG as necessary with movement restriction enforcement activities.
V. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. Containment Zones and response activities will be conducted under the authority and direction of the NC DA&CS SV with support and assistance from the SERT and particularly from the State Highway Patrol (SHP), the NC National Guard (NCNG), and local law enforcement and emergency response agencies. The SV or designated representative representing the NC DA&CS will provide technical guidance in addressing the FAD emergency, participating as the lead technical agency during a FAD outbreak. The SV’s Office will work collaboratively with the USDA Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC) on FAD events including containment zoning, permitting of animal and animal product movements, and quarantine enforcement.

2. Premises for which quarantines will be implemented include infected premises, suspect premises, and contact (exposed) premises. The size and shape of the Containment Zones will be set by the SV (Policy Group) to be consistent with established bio-security requirements as well as the epidemiology and national standards for the specific FAD.

3. Entry/exit points to allow movement of permitted animals and animal products, equipment, personnel, etc. will be set under direction and authority of the SV. A typical structure for a Containment Zone is shown below. Decontamination is addressed in Tab D of this appendix.

(a) Infected Premises. Entry and exit are restricted. Thorough decontamination, following established protocols is necessary for all personnel, equipment, vehicles, and supplies to exit premises.

(b) Infected Zone. Susceptible animal movements are controlled through permitting. Bio-security protocols are required on premises with susceptible animals to protect animals from disease entry (NC Standardized Bio-security Protocol). Scheduled Surveillance activities will be implemented in this zone to determine the extent of disease spread. The initial infected zone would extend ~2 miles (3 km) or as designated by the SV for the disease present from the infected premises.

(c) Buffer (Surveillance) Zones. Surveillance zones can be designated as buffer zones, vaccination zones, etc. depending on measures being implemented within them. Bio-security protocols will be required and permitting for animal/animal product movements as stipulated by SV. Scheduled surveillance activities will be implemented in this zone to
determine the extent of disease spread. This may equate to the 6-mile (10 km) ring used in some other disease plans.

**Example of Quarantine/Control Area Zones:*

![Diagram of Quarantine/Control Area Zones]

VI. REFERENCES

A. NC General Statute 166-A, North Carolina Emergency Management Act, as amended

I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

This tab documents plans for depopulation and disposal of infected and exposed animals designated by the State Veterinarian (SV) during a Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) incident.

II. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. SITUATION

1. Background. A major outbreak of a FAD could have significant impacts on human and/or animal health and cripple for years the State’s agribusiness industry and those other businesses that depend on it. Export and production would decrease. Businesses would fail. Tax revenue generated directly and indirectly would diminish dramatically. The State’s ability to export susceptible animals would virtually end for three to five years. And, if the disease spreads to other states, it could have a devastating impact on the United States’ ability to compete in the global marketplace. To contain and eradicate the disease, it may be necessary to depopulate significant numbers of infected and susceptible animals and properly dispose of their carcasses.

2. Current. After consultation with the USDA, the NC Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (NCDA&CS) through the State Veterinarian (SV) classifies a FAD incident as Highly Suspicious or Confirmed. The SV directs depopulation and disposal of animals within the quarantine area that maintain biosecurity.

B. ASSUMPTIONS

1. Depopulation of certain susceptible animals in some FAD outbreaks may be the best solution to prevent spread and involvement of larger numbers of susceptible animals. Vaccination and other measures may not be available as tools to help stop the spread of the disease agent. In addition, if the disease is zoonotic, then depopulation of animals may be necessary to prevent human exposure.

2. In some FAD outbreaks, a managed eradication approach may be taken where infected animals are not euthanized unless the diseases process so
affects the animal that animal welfare concerns necessitate euthanasia. Methods of depopulation must be approved by the SV.

3. Owners of designated animals will likely have limited capability to depopulate and dispose of their animals on their own in a timely manner to prevent spread of a FAD.

4. Composting will be the preferred method of disposal for most FADs since the disease-causing agent will most likely be inactivated during the process and minimal impacts will be incurred to the environment if performed correctly. Owners of susceptible animals may have sufficient land areas for bio-secure composting of animal carcasses but have limited access to necessary equipment or subject matter experts to perform it correctly. Composting as a carcass disposal option must be approved by appropriate authorities to ensure that potentially detrimental environmental impacts have been evaluated.

5. Disposal methods (rendering, incinerating, burial, etc.) other than composting may be appropriate in certain instances, but due to the increase in bio-security risks and other considerations (risk of spread by transport, environmental, etc.), would be used only in specific situations. Disposal options for infected materials including carcasses must be approved by the SV or USDA.

6. If the owner/operator does not have the resources to perform the prescribed depopulation and disposal in a timely manner, then additional resources will be sought from Federal and State logistics.

7. Disposal methods (rendering, incinerating, etc.) other than burial may be appropriate in certain instances, but due to the increase in bio-security risks and other considerations (risk of spread by transport, environmental etc.), would be used only in specific situations. Disposal options for infected materials including carcasses must be approved by the SV.

8. When local owner/operator resources are exhausted, the State will be able to provide depopulation and disposal assistance through the SERT. State resources for this activity are limited, thus contract resources may be required to address a widespread outbreak. Based on availability of depopulation and disposal resources, the Policy Group may decide to manage infected animals in an outbreak rather than depopulate and dispose of them.
9. Since no one method of depopulating animals and disposing of their carcasses is acceptable in every situation, it is impossible to prescribe such methods in advance. Decisions on these methods will be made as the outbreak progresses—taking into account economic, health, environmental and other factors.

III. MISSION

To depopulate designated animals and dispose of their carcasses such that bio-security is maintained, spread of the disease is prevented, and environmental impact is limited.

IV. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

A. ORGANIZATION

Depopulation and disposal of designated animals will be accomplished on site (whenever possible) under direction of the Case Manager and Biosecurity Officer per instructions from the IMT. Safety is of paramount importance thus the safety officer will review depopulation and disposal protocols and activities.

B. RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Owners of susceptible animals and farm operators have primary responsibility for depopulation of their designated animals and properly disposing of their carcasses.

2. The SV is responsible for:

   (a) Authorizing the depopulation and disposal of designated animals.

   (b) Providing direction and establishing policy that will designate which animals are to be depopulated to facilitate containment and eradication of the FAD.

   (c) Establishing eradication procedures for depopulation and disposal of designated animals.
3. The Case Manager is responsible for coordinating with the owner or contractors, the depopulation and disposal activities on premises. The Biosecurity Officer is responsible for ensuring that all personnel, including owners, follow proper procedures to maintain biosecurity and prevent the spread of the FAD.

4. The IMT Logistics Section is responsible for securing necessary equipment and personnel to accomplish depopulation and disposal should owners of designated animals be unable to do so.

5. The IMT Operations Section is responsible for developing the tactical plans, protocols, and guidance for disposal and depopulation activities. Depopulation and disposal guidance can be found in USDA publications and state plans.

V. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

When directed by the SV, owners will depopulate designated animals and dispose of their carcasses according to approved procedures and instructions from the Case Manager. Should owners have insufficient resources to depopulate and dispose of their designated animals in a timely manner, the Case Manager will request appropriate and necessary assistance through the IMT Logistics and Operations Sections. Such activities will be communicated and documented through NC SPARTA and EMRS.

VI. REFERENCES

A. NC General Statute 166-A, North Carolina Emergency Management Act, as amended

I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

This tab documents plans for decontaminating people, animals, vehicles, and equipment that have or may have been in contact with a Foreign Animal Disease (FAD).

II. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. SITUATION

1. Background. A major outbreak of FAD could cripple the State’s agribusiness industry and those other businesses that depend on it. Export and production would decrease. Businesses would fail. Tax revenue generated directly and indirectly would diminish dramatically. And, if the disease spreads to other states, it could have a devastating impact on the United States’ ability to compete in the global marketplace.

2. Current. A FAD incident under investigation in North Carolina is classified by the NC Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (NCDA&CS) State Veterinarian (SV) working with the United State Department of Agriculture (USDA) Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC) as “High Suspicion”, “Intermediate Suspicion” or “Low Suspicion”. Significant portions of the State’s susceptible animal population can be threatened by diseases such as Foot and Mouth Disease and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza. The SV will direct vehicles, equipment, materials, and some animals that have been in FAD infected areas to be decontaminated to help contain a disease outbreak.

B. ASSUMPTIONS

1. Owners of susceptible animals may have limited capability to decontaminate people, equipment, vehicles, materials, and non-susceptible animals that may have been in contact with a FAD on their premises.

2. The IMT Operations Section will be able to develop an effective and workable protocol for decontamination based on approved protocols from USDA.
3. Local fire departments have limited decontamination capabilities, but may be able to provide assistance in a FAD incident.

4. When local resources are exhausted, the State will be able to provide decontamination assistance through the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) Logistics Section and the NC National Guard (NCNG). State resources for this activity are limited and may not be sufficient to handle a widespread outbreak.

5. The Federal Government will be able to provide decontamination assistance when local and state resources are exhausted. These Federal Government resources may be significantly challenged in multi-state FAD incidents.

6. Contracts with specialty contractors may be required to address decontamination activities for a widespread or long-term FAD incident.

III. MISSION

To decontaminate all persons, vehicles, equipment, material, and non-susceptible animals that have been in FAD infected areas such that biosecurity is maintained and the disease is prevented from spreading.

IV. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

A. ORGANIZATION

Decontamination will be accomplished on site under direction of the Biosecurity Officer according to general instruction from the IMT Operations Section. Decontamination teams may be from NCDA&CS, local fire departments, the NCNG, industry, contractor or a federal agency.

B. RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The SV is responsible for:

   (a) Providing overall direction, identification of infected premises, containment, control, and remediation of North Carolina FAD incidents in coordination with USDA and the SERT Leader.
FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE (FAD) DECONTAMINATION
December 2021

2. The IMT will:

(a) Coordinate the support activities by other State, Federal, and local agencies in support of the NCDA &CS’s FAD response effort.

(b) Carry out the required regulatory management, procurement, finance, and documentation activities in support of the FAD response.

3. The Biosecurity Officer is responsible for directing decontamination activities and ensuring decontamination teams follow procedures to maintain bio-security and prevent the disease from spreading.

4. The IMT Operations Section is responsible for coordinating with local fire departments and emergency response organizations to arrange for decontamination teams. The Operations Section is also responsible for assigning decontamination teams to premises and providing decontamination protocols/guidelines.

5. Local fire departments are responsible to provide such manpower and equipment as resources allow serving as on-site decontamination teams.

6. The IMT Logistics Section is responsible for securing necessary equipment and personnel for decontamination efforts should the task be beyond local capabilities.

7. The animal production industry is expected to establish contingency contracts with their normal clean-up and decontamination contractors to be available to respond quickly in the event of a disease outbreak or other catastrophic event.
V. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. When ordered by the SV (or designees), the IMT Operations Section will coordinate with the designated Biosecurity Officers and Case Managers to provide resources to accomplish decontamination if the owner/operator cannot. If the owner/operator can provide decontamination, the Case Manager and Biosecurity Officer will work to develop a contract for such activities. Decontamination is to be accomplished according to instructions and protocols provided by the IMT, and under supervision of the Biosecurity Officer. Should the decontamination task exceed local capabilities, the SERT Logistics Section will arrange for additional decontamination teams. Should decontamination requirements exceed local and state capabilities, it will be necessary to request assistance from the federal government through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) or private decontamination contractors.

2. Decontamination will need to be performed in all zones to some degree. The degree of decontamination needed will depend on which zone the premises is located or if they have any know contacts with an infected premise. For example, close proximity to an infected premise may increase the risk of becoming infected and thus the need for more stringent decontamination protocols. The IMT Operations Section will establish protocols and procedures for each zone.

VI. References


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APHIS</td>
<td>Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVIC</td>
<td>Area Veterinarian-in-Charge</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ag EOC</td>
<td>Agriculture Emergency Operations Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPS</td>
<td>Department of Public Safety</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRDP</td>
<td>County Receiving and Distribution Point</td>
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<td>DEQ</td>
<td>Department of Environmental Quality</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFCO</td>
<td>Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer</td>
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<td>DROC</td>
<td>Disaster Recovery Operations Center</td>
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<td>DSCO</td>
<td>Deputy State Coordinating Officer</td>
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<td>E&amp;EI</td>
<td>Education and Emergency Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOC</td>
<td>Emergency Operations Center</td>
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<td>FAD</td>
<td>Foreign Animal Disease</td>
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<td>FADD</td>
<td>Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Federal Coordinating Officer</td>
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<td>FMD</td>
<td>Foot and Mouth Disease</td>
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<td>GAR</td>
<td>Governor’s Authorized Representative</td>
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<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographical Information Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAP</td>
<td>Incident Action Plan</td>
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<td>ICP</td>
<td>Incident Command Post</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICS</td>
<td>Incident Command System</td>
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<td>IFG</td>
<td>Individual and Family Grant</td>
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<td>IS</td>
<td>Information Systems</td>
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<td>JFO</td>
<td>Joint Field Office</td>
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<td>NCDA&amp;CS</td>
<td>North Carolina Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCEM</td>
<td>North Carolina Emergency Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCSHP</td>
<td>North Carolina State Highway Patrol</td>
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<td>NCNG</td>
<td>North Carolina National Guard</td>
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<td>NFIP</td>
<td>National Flood Insurance Program</td>
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<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Incident Management System</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Public Assistance</td>
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<td>PAA</td>
<td>Public Assistance Appeals</td>
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<td>QA</td>
<td>Quality Assurance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Staging Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>State Coordinating Officer</td>
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<td>SHP</td>
<td>State Highway Patrol (North Carolina)</td>
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<td>SART</td>
<td>State Agricultural Response Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>SITREP</td>
<td>Situation Report (Also SitRep)</td>
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<td>SV</td>
<td>State Veterinarian</td>
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<tr>
<td>TL</td>
<td>Taskforce Leader</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCS</td>
<td>Unified Command System</td>
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<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture</td>
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<tr>
<td>VS</td>
<td>Veterinary Supervisor</td>
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</table>
African Swine Fever (Mistakenly called Hog Cholera in some countries) A highly contagious and deadly viral disease affecting both domestic and feral swine of all ages. It is not a threat to human health and cannot be transmitted from pigs to humans. It is not a food safety issue. Clinical signs are exhibited 3-21 days after infection and may include high fevers, cyanosis, depression, abortion in pregnant sows and extensive hemorrhages in internal organs, especially the lymph nodes, kidneys, and alimentary tract. Death may be the first sign. Transmission is by direct contact, fomites, and vectors (soft ticks). The disease is extremely resistant to environmental conditions and can remain viable in blood, tissue, or bone marrow for long periods of time.

Allocated Resources Resources dispatched to an incident that have not yet checked in with the logistical staging area’s or disaster field office’s communication center.

Assigned Resources Resources that have been assigned work tasks and have checked in with their destination’s communication center.

Assisting Agency An agency directly providing support to another agency involved in preparation, response, or recovery.

Communications Center Receives and routes information about the incident and the status of resources. May include the Message Center for internal information distribution as well as capabilities for intra-agency information transmittal.

Cost Sharing Agreements Agreements between agencies or jurisdictions to share designated costs related to an incident. These are usually written, but may be verbal between designated authorized representatives of the agencies or jurisdictions.
Depopulation

The term depopulation refers to the rapid destruction of a population of animals in response to urgent circumstances with as much consideration given to the welfare of the animals as practicable. Urgent circumstances may include emergency situations, such as the need for immediate disease control or a response to natural or human-made disasters. (https://www.avma.org/sites/default/files/resources/AVMA-Guidelines-for-the-Depopulation-of-Animals.pdf) Depopulation methods must be approved by the State Veterinarian.

Classical Swing Fever

(Also called Hog Cholera in some countries) A highly contagious viral disease of pigs with a potential mortality rate of 100%. Clinical signs are typically exhibited 2-14 days after infection and may include fever, anorexia, conjunctivitis, respiratory signs, and neurological signs. Humans are not susceptible to the virus.

Incident Action Plan

The plan that is usually prepared at the beginning of each operational period that contains general control objectives reflecting the overall operational strategy and specific action plans for the next operational period.

Incident Command Post

The location where primary command functions are carried out. As the command function transfers so does the Incident Command Post (ICP).

Incident Management Team

Combinations of personnel with NIMS/ICS training from a variety of agencies capable of establishing a team for local event coordination and management.

Incident Objectives

Statement of strategies and tactical directions of resources. Must be realistic based on available resources, achievable, measurable and yet flexible enough to allow for changes in the situation.

County Receiving and Distribution Point

A location where personnel and equipment are temporarily stored pending assignment, release, or reassignment.
**Operational Period**  
Period of time set for operational actions specified in the Incident Action Plan. Traditionally these periods are initially 12 to 24 hours in length. As the incident winds down, they may cover longer periods of activity.

**Planning Meeting**  
A meeting to select specific strategies and tactics for incident control operations and for services and support planning. These meetings are usually held, at minimum, once every operational period.

**Resources**  
All personnel, equipment, and supplies available, or potentially available, for assignments on specific incident related tasks (Includes only those personnel, equipment or supplies that are tracked).

**State Agricultural Response Team**  
The 501.3(c) organization created in North Carolina following Hurricane Floyd in 1999 to coordinate animal related response issues related to disasters. It represents a cooperative effort by the NCDA & CS, NC DPS-DEM, NCSU CES & CVM, Industry Partners, volunteer professionals, and private citizens with a shared interest in animal welfare, wildlife, and the livestock industry. Upon activation by SERT/Division of EM, the partnership of SART acts under the leadership of NCDA & CS through the AG Emergency Operations Center located in the Agriculture Building.

**Single Resource**  
A team of individuals with an independent supervisor, a piece of equipment with its personnel complement or an individual that can be used on an incident.

**System**  
The operational combination of facilities, personnel, resources, and procedures operating within a shared organizational structure with responsibility for accomplishing stated incident objectives.

**Task Force**  
A group of resources with shared communication and leader. It may be pre-established and sent to an incident or it may be created at the incident. Examples for a FAD incident include but are not limited to depopulation, disposal, and decontamination task forces.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Technical Specialists</strong></th>
<th>Personnel with special knowledge or skills who are activated only when needed.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trans-species Infection</strong></td>
<td>An infection that can be passed between two or more species (May include human hosts).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unit</strong></td>
<td>An organizational group having functional responsibility for a specific incident plan, operational, logistical, or financial activity.</td>
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